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Abstract We investigate financing constraints in a large cross-country 
data set covering most of the European economy. Firm level investment 
sensitivity to cash flow is used to identify financing constraints. We find 
that the sensitivities are significantly positive on average, controlling for 
country and industry fixed effects, as well as firm level controls. Most 
importantly, the cash flow sensitivity of investment is lower in countries 
with better-developed financial markets. This suggests that financial 
development may mitigate financial constraints. This effect is weaker in 
conglomerate subsidiaries, which are likely to have access to internal 
capital markets and depend less on the outside financial environment, 
and possibly for firms in industries with highly liquid assets as well. This 
result sheds light on the link between financial and economic 
development.  
JEL Codes: E22, E44, G31, L10. 
Key words: Financial Constraints, Investment, Europe, Financial Development 
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A large research literature has established that firms tend to invest more when they have 
more internal resources available. This has been interpreted as a sin that external finance is not 
available for all firms at all times (at least not on attractive terms). Firms whose investment is 
limited because of a lack of internal resources and a lack of access to external financing are 
referred to as “financially constrained”. Our research compares financial constraints across 
European countries. We examine companies of various sizes in a large cross-country data set 
covering most of the European economy. As is standard in the literature, we identify financial 
constraints with investment to cash flow sensitivity at the firm level, i.e. we take firms in a 
country to be more financially constrained if their investment responds more to internal cash 
flow (than that in other countries). In line with the previous literature, we find that the 
sensitivities are significantly positive on average, meaning that firms invest more when internal 
resources are plentiful. This holds when we control for country and industry effects, as well as 
firm characteristics.  
 
Most importantly, the cash flow sensitivity of investment is lower in countries with 
better-developed financial markets. Countries such as Switzerland and the Netherlands (which 
rank high on both our measures of financial development) exhibit a lower impact of firm cash 
flow on investment, on average, than countries such as Hungary, Finland and Italy (which rank 
relatively low). This suggests that financial development reduces the impact of financial 
constraints, presumably by allowing easier access to external finance for those firms that need it.  
 
Conglomerate subsidiaries have access to internal capital markets (i.e. transfers from the 
parent company) and therefore depend less on outside finance. It is therefore predicted that 
they should face lower financial constraints, and, consequently, benefit less from financial 
development, than free-standing firms.  Indeed, we find that the effect of financial development 
is weaker in conglomerate subsidiaries. This supports the theory that financial development 
reduces constraints to outside financing. Our results shed light on the link between financial 
and economic development, and provides a mechanism for how financial development may 
help economic growth.   
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1. Introduction 
Recent research has emphasized that firm heterogeneity in productivity is substantial, 
even within narrow sectors, and that productivity variation within industries is important 
relative to cross-industry differences. Firm- and plant-level evidence shows that the reallocation 
of capital from less productive to more productive establishments plays a significant role in 
accounting for aggregate productivity growth.1 The research has proved that resource allocation 
across firms is an important determinant of aggregate (or average) productivity and reallocation 
is an important driver of productivity growth. There are ample reasons to suspect that the 
allocation and reallocation of resources across firms is affected by input market contracting. For 
example, Bertrand, Schoar and Thesmar (2004) show that bank deregulation in France changed 
the allocation of credit toward profitable firms and firms with good investment opportunities.  
This study compares investment constraints across European countries, allowing us to 
identify some institutional factors that affect investment constraints. We use a firm-level data 
set across 38 European countries (of which 21 have the required country-level data and are used 
in regressions).  We adopt the broad methodology originally suggested by Fazzari, Hubbard 
and Petersen (1988), who proposed that positive coefficient on cash flows to assets in a 
regression of investment on cash flow and market to book value (Q) suggested presence of 
financial constraints. 2 Because we focus on a large number of firms without stock prices (since 
these are unlisted) and hence without data on Q, we attempt to control for investment 
opportunities with alternative controls.  We use two alternative sets of controls, one based on an 
Euler equation and one based on introducing a dynamic error structure to a static capital 
demand equation.  These specifications are drawn from the literature examining the investment 
                                                      
1 See Bartelsman and Doms (2000) for a survey of research on firm-level productivity differences.  
See e.g. Davis and Haltiwanger (1996) about productivity growth and Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan 
(1998) for an overview and evidence on both growth and levels. See Roberts and Tybout (1996) for non-
US evidence. 
2 All our results should be interpreted keeping in mind important critiques of using cash flow 
sensitivity of investments as a proxy for financial constraints.  These critiques are discussed in more detail 
in Section 1.1. 
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behavior of unlisted firms (and are especially close to the specifications in Bond, Elston, 
Mairesse and Mulkay (2003)). 
We find that in our dataset there is a strongly positive coefficient on the cash flow, 
suggesting the presence of financial constraints. We also find that the cash flow sensitivity of 
investment is lower in countries with better finance, which suggests that investment is less 
likely to be constrained in countries with better financial development. In other words, better 
input markets reduce the dependence of firms on internal resources. This finding is consistent 
with Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) who show that fewer firms are constrained in 
countries with better financial systems.  Our results extend the Bond et al (2003) study to larger 
sample of countries, and our results suggest a somewhat different effect of financial 
development on firm-level investment behavior.3   
We undertake a number of additional robustness checks and extensions of our basic 
results.  First, we examine the cash-flow sensitivity and the role of financial development on the 
investment behavior of conglomerate firms.  We find that conglomerate firms, which have 
access to internal capital markets, show lower cash flow sensitivities of investment. Further, we 
find that better financial markets have weaker influence on financial constraints for 
conglomerate firms.  This is what could be expected if conglomerates indeed ameliorate cash 
flow constraint at their subsidiary firms through reallocation of capital through an internal 
capital market (though there may still be constraints on group level investment).   
Second, we examine if our results are driven by the presence of firms in the financial 
services and real estate sectors, where measured investment behavior could be driven by a 
number of factors specific to the industry. These firms comprise only a small fraction of our 
total sample and we find our results robust to the exclusion of these firms.  
Third, we check if our results are driven simply by broad differences in investment 
behavior for Eastern European firms, by examining the basic regressions separately for Western 
                                                      
3 Bond et al (2003) cautiously interpret their findings of a higher coefficient on cash flows for the  
United Kingdom as suggesting that “the market oriented financial system in the United Kingdom 
performs less well in channeling investment funds to firms with profitable investment opportunities than 
do the continental European financial system”.  They caution that their results could be subject to other 
interpretations.  Our findings suggest that a better developed banking and bond market may in fact help 
to reduce the dependence of firms on internal finances for undertaking investments. 
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and Eastern European firms. The identification of the effects we are interested in is weakened 
by the reduction of sample sizes, especially for Eastern Europe – we are left with only seven 
countries in Eastern Europe. Our findings provide no evidence for differences in the importance 
of financial development between East and West.4 
Fourthly, we examine investment behavior of firms in industries with highly liquid 
assets vs. industries with less liquid assets.  The expected effects are somewhat ambiguous.  On 
the one hand, firms with liquid assets are more likely to be able to use their assets as collateral 
for external financing. Their financial constraints are therefore perhaps less related to financial 
development and financial sophistication. On the other hand, Myers and Rajan (1998) suggest 
that banks may be more reluctant to lend to firms with highly liquid assets as they may fear that 
managers could more easily manipulate assets in these industries. To test these ideas, we use a 
liquidity ranking of industries based on US data on asset trades by industry, which we assume 
is applicable to the same industries in Europe. Our results suggest, tentatively, that firms in 
industries with less liquid assets may benefit more from financial development. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1 presents related research, section 
2 discusses our theoretical predictions, Section 3 discusses data sources the sample and  Section 
4 presents the baseline results.  In Section 5 we examine extensions of the baseline specifications 
and conduct some robustness checks.  Section 6 concludes. 
2. Background and literature 
The closest paper to this is Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) who find that 
countries with better financial development see relatively more firms growing faster than 
predicted by internal accounting data. There are several differences. We use firm level data in 
our main regressions, rather than country averages. This difference in methodology means that 
we exploit more variation in the data, at the cost of some added complexity. We also make 
different assumptions on firm growth and investment in order to identify the effect of external 
finance. Most importantly, we study the effect of internal cash flow on investment, rather than 
the fraction of firms growing faster than predicted. In that sense, we extend Demirgüç-Kunt and 
                                                      
4 We also undertook a country-by country analysis of investment, and results here confirmed our 
findings (see Appendix). 
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Maksimovic’s results: better financial development not only helps some firms grow faster, it 
also particularly helps firms which are likely to be financially constrained. 
2.1. Cash flow sensitivity of investment 
We use the sensitivity of investment to cash flow as a measure of the frictions involved 
in the allocation of resources to firms as first suggested by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen 
(1988). They argued that if external financing is available without frictions and at zero cost, a 
firm’s investment should be determined only by its investment opportunities, not by its internal 
resources. Empirically, Fazzari et al argue that Q (market value of equity over book value) 
captures investment opportunities and that cash flow captures internal resources. They find that 
cash flow often predicts investment, but that Q often does not. Importantly, non-dividend 
paying firms in the US (Fazzari et al) and firms in Japan not affiliated with a Keiretsu business 
group (Hoshi, Kashyap Scharfstein 1991) exhibit higher correlations between cash flows and 
investment than other firms. This is consistent with these firms being more constrained than 
others.5  
A large literature has followed these early findings (see e.g. Bond and van Reenen (2006) 
for a recent survey), attempting to use cash-flow sensitivity as a sign of financial frictions. 
However, concerns have been raised about the validity of the methodology. In an influential 
paper, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) make two points. First, they argue that the theoretical 
predictions are more ambiguous than Fazzari et al suggest. Second, they argue that empirically, 
dividend payers are not necessarily less constrained than other firms. These critiques have been 
expanded and developed. For example, Alti (2003) shows that young firms will naturally have 
less informative Q than more mature firms (because of their skewed future payoffs). Young 
firms’ investment may be correlated with cash flow not because they are constrained but 
because their cash flow contains information about short term investment opportunities beyond 
Q. Abel and Eberly (2002) make a related point: small, fast-growing firms may exhibit cash flow 
sensitivity because their Q does not quite capture investment opportunities, even if their 
financing is frictionless. Gomes (2001) also suggest that Q will not properly capture underlying 
shocks. All these papers imply that non-zero coefficients cannot necessarily be interpreted as 
                                                      
5 See e.g. Campello (2004) for more recent evidence from US banks. 
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evidence of constraints. Note, however, that Gomes does find consistently higher cash flow 
coefficients when constraints are higher (table 5, 9, 15).6  
Given these important critiques, we will not focus on the existence of positive cash flow 
coefficients per se, but instead test whether they systematically vary with levels of financial 
development. We are essentially testing if some countries have higher sensitivity of investment 
to cash flow because their markets for external capital provision are less well developed. We do 
not compare firms, as much of the previous literature does, but countries. Interpreting higher 
cash flow sensitivities in a country as a negative effect of worse financial development is less 
ambiguous. 
Perhaps the most closely related paper in this group is Bond et al. (2003) which studies 
the role of cash flow in investment equations for European firms from four countries. Like us, 
they study the differences in cash flow coefficients across countries. We extend their 
methodology of comparing countries, but because we have a larger sample with more 
countries, we can do this more rigorously, i.e. we test formally whether cash flow coefficients 
are related to measures of financial development.7 
2.2. Firm size distributions, entry and exit 
Our paper is related to evidence on how growth, entry and exit depends on frictions and 
institutions in Europe. Using a similar data set, Klapper, Laeven and Rajan (2003) show that 
financial development and labor regulation as well as entry regulation affect entry rates across 
                                                      
6 See also Moyen (2004), who shows that financing constraints may generate data similar to 
Fazzari et al’s and later findings. 
7 T h e  B o n d  e t  a l  p a p e r  a l s o  u n d e r t a k e s  a  c a reful GMM based estimation of the regression 
specifications.  Our investigations of different GMM specifications yielded highly imprecise and noisy 
results across specifications -- the GMM approach appears to demand too much of our data. (Also given 
our large data sizes, GMM estimations are extremely resource and time intensive, even when run 
separately country-by-country).  Since we focus on differences in cash flow/profitability coefficients 
across countries, we expect any endogeneity issues biasing coefficients up or down to not be a severe 
issue insofar as the amount of bias is uncorrelated with financial development. This expectation is 
supported by results in Bond, et al (2003) – while they get different coefficients for variables across GMM 
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Europe. Scarpetta, Hemmings, Tressel and Woo (2002) also show that rates of entry and exit at 
the national level are affected by regulation. Since entry and exit decisions take place mostly at 
the bottom of the size distribution, our results are somewhat different in that they look at 
investment, i.e. at already existing firms. Desai, Gompers and Lerner (2003) show that political, 
legal and regulatory variables affect entry and exit in emerging markets (i.e. Eastern Europe) 
but not in Western Europe. They also show some that these variables impact average size and 
the skewness of size distributions. Kumar, Rajan and Zingales (2001) find that firm size is 
increasing in various measures of financial development. Our results concern the determinant 
of investment, i.e. growth, rather than static size distribution of firms. 
2.3. Allocations 
Our findings on cross-firm investment allocations are complementary to research on 
cross-industry investment allocations. The latter have been shown to respond more to 
productivity differences when external financial markets are more developed. In particular, 
Wurgler (2000) shows that the cross-industry allocation of investment is more responsive to 
sector-level productivity in countries with better developed stock markets. These findings are 
consistent with our results, but do not concern within-industry allocations (we analyze how 
investment depends on cash flow and productivity holding industry fixed). 
2.4. Aggregate frictions 
Finally, our results shed light on research establishing a link between input market 
frictions and aggregate economic performance (see King and Levine (1993) and Rajan and 
Zingales (1998) regarding financial markets; Besley and Burgess (2004) for labor markets; see 
also Blanchard and Giavazzi (2004) for a model of product and labor market frictions). We 
provide new evidence on the costs of financial frictions, suggesting a channel for these 
aggregate effects. 
3. Predictions 
In this section, we summarize the theory behind our empirical research design. We 
analyze investment-cash flow sensitivities and compare their magnitude across countries. First, 
we test if on average, cash flow has a positive correlation with investment after controlling for 
industry-time-country interaction fixed effects as well as firm level controls. This would 
11
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indicate some kind of constraints on the financing of firms or some kind of friction in financial 
markets. 
In our tests, we will not use firm level Q (market to book value of assets) as a control. 
Measuring Q is problematic for listed firms, and for all practical purposes impossible for non-
listed firms. Since our intent is to include the largest possible set of firms, we cannot hope to use 
Q. To some extent we are reassured by the general finding in the literature that firm Q generally 
has a weak relation with investment. However, we do attempt to mitigate the possible omitted 
variable bias from not controlling for investment opportunities by including firm level 
variables. We use two specifications, both based on Bond et al (2003). 
The first specification is based on an Euler equation derived from a dynamic 
optimization model, assuming a quadratic adjustment cost. The model does not yield neat 
closed form solutions and ideally requires knowledge of the firm specific rental rate of capital. 
Following Bond et al, we substitute industry-year fixed effects and log output to capital ratio to 
proxy for the unobserved rental rates. The regression equation is: 
 
Ii,t = α1 Ii,t-1  + α 2 I i,t-12  +  α 3 (logY i,t-1-logK i,t-1) +  α4 ROA i,t-1 + ηj,t  + ε i,t   (1)   
 
where Ii,t, i s  g r o s s  i n v e s t m e n t  n o r m a l i z e d  b y  f i x e d  a s s e t s  b y  f i r m  i  i n  p e r i o d  t ,  R O A  i s  
EBITDA/Fixed Assets (same normalization as investment), Yi,t -1 is lagged output, Ki,t-1 is lagged 
capital and ηj,t denotes industry-year fixed effects. Note that ROA based on cash flow before 
interest and taxes (EBITDA), not net cash flow.  The reason for using EBITDA is that it is 
predicted by the Euler equation to enter (negatively). A positive coefficient can then be 
interpreted as signifying financial constraints.8 Hereafter we refer to the specification in 
Equation 1 as the Euler equation model. 
The second model is derived by introducing second order (ADL (2,2)) dynamics into a  
static capital demand equation (obtained from profit maximization subject to constant returns to 
scale and a CES production function): 
 
                                                      
8 Since the EBITDA variable is closely correlated with cash flow measures, the results from this 
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   I i,t = α1 I i,t-1 + α2(logY i,t - logY i,t-1) + α3(logY i,t-1 -logY i,t-2)  
+ α4 error  + α5 CF i,t + α6 CF i,t-1 + ηj,t  + ε i,t    (2) 
 
where It and Yt are as defined in equation 1 above, error stands for the error correction term 
(log Ki,t-2 – log Yi, t-2).  Hereafter, we refer to the specification in equation 2 as the Econometric 
model. 
We examine the effect of financial development on constraints for investments by 
interacting the ROA term (in the Euler equation model) and the CF term (in the Econometric 
model) with a proxy for financial development. A negative (positive) coefficient on the 
interaction term would be interpreted as a indicating a decrease (increase) in financial 
constraints with financial development.9  In Section 5 below, we consider a number of 
extensions and robustness checks of our basic specifications.   
4. Data 
4.1. Amadeus 
Our firm-level data is taken from Amadeus, a commercial database provided by Bureau 
van Dijk. It contains at least some financial information on over 7 million private and publicly 
owned firms across 38 European countries. The database includes up to 10 years of information 
per company and is created by collecting data from 35 information providers across Europe, 
generally the office of the Registrar of Companies, and standardizing it. We use a sample of 
larger firms, for which data quality and coverage is likely to be better than the smallest firms.  
We use the 2004 edition of Amadeus for large and medium firms, including all firms 
with operating revenue of at least €1M, total assets of at least €2M and 20 employees or more 
(for the UK, Germany, France, Italy, Ukraine and Russia the number are €1.5M, €3M, and 20, 
respectively). This sample contains approximately 1.5M firms. We then limit our sample by 
                                                      
9 In the appendix, we report results from running the basic specifications country-by-country and 
examining the coefficients against financial development.  As discussed in the appendix, the regression of 
the estimated coefficients needs to adjust for the standard errors of the estimated cash flow coefficients.  
Since we cluster our standard errors at the country level, the standard error on the interaction 
specification implicitly adjusts for this.  
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imposing the restriction that value added, capital and sales or turnover variables must be 
available. The database includes firm-level accounting data in standardized format for balance 
sheet and income statement items. Despite EU harmonization and international convergence in 
accounting standards and practices, there are differences in the accounting and these 
transformed accounts should therefore be interpreted with some caution. We use gross 
investment, defined as {(Fixed Assets in year t) – (Fixed Assets in year t-1) + Depreciation (t)} 
divided by (Fixed assets in year t-1).   
Our cash flow variable is net income plus changes in deferred taxes, normalized by fixed 
assets (the same normalization as that used for investment). Profits are defined as EBITDA 
normalized by total assets. The cash flow and profit variables were winsorized at 0.5% and 
99.5% to eliminate effects from extreme outliers. 
In addition to financial information, Amadeus also provides other firm-level 
information. We use firm-level employment to measure labor inputs. Second, Amadeus 
provides various industry classifications – e.g. national industry codes, 3-digit European 
industry classification codes (NACE) and US NAICS codes – which we use to classify firms and 
construct industry dummy variables. In our analysis, we use 4-digit NAICS codes to construct 
industry dummies, and also categorize all firms by a 2-digit level NAICS code for industry 
interaction terms (see below). We classify firms as belonging to a conglomerate if Amadeus 
reports an ultimate holding company id number.10 
The regular Amadeus files do not include banks, but it does include other financial 
firms. As one of our robustness checks, we exclude all firms classified as belonging to NAICS 52 
and 53 (both finance and real estate).  
                                                      
10 Briefly, an ultimate owner is indicated as the largest shareholder company, if the largest 
shareholder company has at least 24.99% shareholding. If the immediate parent company is in turn 
owned by multiple companies, the ownership path is followed upward on the largest shareholding path.  
The upward trace is stopped when they reach a firm with no known single shareholder. Each trace 
upward is made only if a single shareholder has at least 24.99% holding. We only consider the existence 
of an ultimate owner, not that owner’s identity. 
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4.2. Other data sources 
Finance. The ideal measure of financial development would capture the ability of firms 
with good investment opportunities (positive NPV) to find outside financing in case of need. 
Such a measure is difficult to come by across many countries, so we use two alternative 
measures, each of which has its strengths and weaknesses. Our two measures focus on banks on 
the one hand, and banks as well as debt markets on the other. Based on the financial database of 
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2001), we calculate the total volume of bank credit to the 
private sector, divided by GDP. The number refers to 1995, ahead of almost all of our Amadeus 
firm observations. Secondly, we use the market value of all outstanding bonds + private credit, 
normalized by GDP, as a measure of financial market development. This measure is also from 
Beck et al (2001). By taking these variables to represent finance, we disregard the role of outside 
equity. However, for almost all firms in our sample, outside equity is likely to be very limited. 
Furthermore, different measures of financial development are highly correlated across 
countries. We have tried using broader measures of finance, including equity markets, but find 
that our results are very similar. 
Asset liquidity. We use an industry-level measure of asset liquidity. We use US data to 
avoid endogeneity issues. Using this measure as a proxy for liquidity assumes that industries 
rank similarly in the European sample in terms of asset liquidity. This seems fairly innocuous 
since technological features of assets are likely to be fairly similar across different (rich) 
economies, but we cannot verify that it is correct.  
Our liquidity measure is defined as sales of PPE (plant, property and equipment) 
divided by net PPE, aggregated at the industry level (4-digit NAICS).11 In order to make the 
measure capture time-invariant features of industry asset liquidity, we take averages for 1985-
95, the ten years preceding the sample of firm data we use. Alternatively, we have used an 
average spanning the 1971-2004 period, maximizing the amount of data, which gives very 
similar results (not reported).12 
                                                      
11 We thank Efraim Benmelech for sharing this with us. 
12 We have also tried triple interactions of liquidity interacted with financial development and 
firm cash flow. The results are similar, but requires interpreting a larger number of coefficients. 
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4.3. Sample overview 
Following the practice in the literature, we restrict the sample to those with strictly 
positive investment i.e. drop firm observations for which gross investment is negative. Also, to 
avoid outliers we eliminate observations for which CF/A is larger than ten.  
Table 1 reports financial variables for each country. We report two measures: private 
credit (later called PCBank) and private credit plus bond market capitalization (PCBB). As 
expected, richer countries tend to have higher values for both measures. Also, Western 
European countries tend to have the highest values. The highest numbers, corresponding to the 
most developed banking systems, are for Switzerland (1.66), Germany (1.14), Sweden (1.17) and 
the UK (1.14). Including the bond market does not change the rankings much: the correlation 
between the measures is 0.88 and the rank correlation is 0.84. The levels are much higher in 
many countries, however, notably Switzerland (3.96), the UK (2.62) and the Netherlands (2.00). 
Table 2 reports summary statistics across firms in our sample. We report three categories 
of variables: those used throughout, those used for the Euler equation model and those used for 
the econometric model. All-in-all there is about 1.9 million observations, though we often have 
fewer observations when all missing data is taken into account. The general variables are 
PCBank and PCBB, the conglomerate dummy, the number of employees, firm age and 
investment. Investment is 0.50 on average, and the median is 0.22. There is a tail of considerably 
higher values. This may seem large, but note that the sample excludes all negative investment 
firms. Average firm age is approximately 17 years and half the firms are less than 12 years old. 
For the Euler Equation model, we use the following additional variables -- squared investment, 
lagged capital intensity and ROA (EBITDA over fixed assets). Profitability averages 0.116 and 
has a median of 0.105. For the Econometric model, we also use the variables output growth, 
capital-output ratio and cash flow (after taxes and interest, normalized by fixed assets). Cash 
flow averages 0.589 and has a median of 0.304. 
5. Results 
This section presents the basic regression of investment on contemporaneous cash flow 
and controls. As pointed out above, we cannot control for Q because most companies in our 
sample are unlisted. To control for desired investment (in the absence of frictions), we therefore 
employ two regression specifications as described in Section 2 above. We refer to these as the 
16
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Euler equation model and the Econometric specification. For each table, we report two panels of 
results, one for each method. 
Table 3 shows our basic regression: investment regressed on cash flow, firm level 
controls and country-industry-year dummies. For the Euler equation model, column (1) shows 
that cash flow enters with a positive and significant coefficient, which we interpret (subject to 
caveats discussed in Section 1.1) as reflecting financial constraints. The estimated effect on 
investment is small. Changing profits from the 25th to the 75th percentile implies that the right 
hand side variable is higher by 0.0448, i.e. investment is higher by 4.5% of fixed capital. 
Increasing profits by one standard deviation increases investment by about a tenth of a 
standard deviation. Column (2) repeats the same regression for the sample of firms for which 
we have financial development data. Column (3) includes an interaction of financial 
development and firm level profits, using the broader measure of financial development PCBB. 
The regression shows that profits have a muted impact on investment in countries with higher 
financial development: the interaction coefficient is negative and significant. The negative 
coefficient suggests that financial constraints are less severe when there is better financial 
development. This is our main finding. The magnitude of this effect is large, and suggests that 
moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile of financial development (across firms) will reduce 
the effect of profits by about 27% (from 0.088 to 0.064). Column (4) represents the regression for 
the subset for which there is financial development data for the more restricted measure of 
financial development (PCBank) and column (5) presents a regression with PCBank interacted 
with firm level profits. The interaction for this measure is significant (but less so than the 
previous interaction) and slightly larger in magnitude. Here, moving from the 25th to the 75th 
percentile of financial development is estimated to reduce the effect of profits by approximately 
three quarters. 
The second panel presents similar results for the Econometric model. The effect of 
profits and cash flow in this specification is smaller but also highly significant, suggesting that 
financial constraints are significant. Importantly, the interaction with financial development is 
negative and significant for PCBB, here moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile of financial 
development reduces the effect of cash flow by approximately half. The result for PCBank is 
insignificant, i.e. in this specification, higher financial development does not reduce the cash-
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flow sensitivity of investment. This is in contrast to the Euler-equation results using PCBank 
and the results for both models using PCBB. 
6. Extensions and robustness 
This section presents a series of extensions and robustness tests.  We have also tried 
restricting the sample to those country-industry-year cells which include 20 observations or 
more, and found very similar results, confirming that our results are not driven by outlier 
industries, countries or years (not reported). 
6.1. Conglomerates 
Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991) find that firms that form part of a conglomerate 
have lower cash flow-investment sensitivities.13 We now test whether this is the case in our 
sample. Table 4, column (1) to (3), reproduce results from Table 3, i.e. our baseline specification, 
for both models.14 In columns (4) to (6), we restrict the sample to conglomerate firms, i.e. firms 
which have a specified large shareholder which is also a firm. Profits and cash flow seem to 
matter less for these firms, which is consistent with such firms having access to internal capital 
markets, or facing lower financing constraints for some other reason.  
Our results suggest that financial development helps conglomerate firms, but less than 
non-conglomerate firms. The interactions with financial development are significant in all cases, 
but always lower than for non-conglomerate firms.15 On possible function of conglomerates is to 
finance investment using resources, reallocated through internal capital markets. If this makes 
individual divisions less dependent on the external finance, we expect financial development to 
                                                      
13 See also Campello (2004) regarding internal capital markets and investment. Note that we look 
at the effect of subsidiary level cash flow on investment at the subsidiary level; results could differ for the 
effect of firm-level aggregate cash flow on investment at the subsidiary or firm level (see e.g. Lamont 
(1997) regarding conglomerate level cash flows and firm investment). 
14 From this point on, in order to save some space, we suppress the estimated coefficients for 
control variables and report only the coefficients for cash flow and the cash flow interactions.  
15 The difference between conglomerates and the overall sample is significant at the 5% level in 
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matter less for divisions. Therefore this finding is consistent with the theory that financial 
development reduces financial constraints for firms that are more dependent on external capital 
markets.16 
6.2. Excluding financial and real estate firms 
Financial firms, as well as real estate firms, may have accounting data of a very different 
nature from other sectors which might affect results. While the Amadeus files do not contain 
banks, several firms are classified as belonging to NAICS 52 (Financial activities) or 53 (Real 
estate and rental and leasing). We exclude these firms, to make sure that they do not drive the 
main results of Table 3. In Table 5, we report profit and cash flow coefficients for the sub-sample 
without NAICS 52 and 53. The sample size is reduced marginally in both panels. The 
coefficients and significance is virtually unaffected by this exclusion, confirming that our results 
are general to the sample and not driven by the small number of financial firms and real estate 
firms. 
6.3. Western versus Eastern Europe 
Our sample covers the much richer Western European countries as well as the poorer 
Eastern countries. These have a much lower financial development as well as overall economic, 
regulatory, and political development. We now turn to a geographical split of our sample, to 
rule out the possibility that the financial development indicator matters simply because it 
separates Western European from Eastern European countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, and Ukraine). By separating the 
samples, we test in effect whether the Portugal-Germany difference or the Latvia-Czech 
Republic difference affect cash flow coefficients, ignoring any differences between east and 
west. 
Table 6 reports results allowing financial development to exert different effects in the 
two parts of Europe separately. Column (1) of both panels shows a regression with no 
interaction, recapping previous results. The rest of the regressions suggest two things. First, this 
                                                      
16 As Wolfenzon and Almeida (2006) point out, conglomerates may reduce financial constraints 
for divisions but still make finance more restricted for the central corporation through equilibrium effects. 
Our results are quiet about this prediction since we only include divisions in the regression in Table 4. 
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does not change our main inference: in all cases (the Euler Equation model as well as the 
Econometric model, PCBB as well as PCBank) cash flow exerts a smaller effect on investment 
when financial development is better, as in out overall cases. Second, the evidence for a 
different effect in Eastern Europe is weak at best, with three insignificant interactions (Panel 1, 
column (3) and (5) as well as Panel 2 column (3)) and one significant (Panel 2 column (5)) of 
unexpected sign and unreasonable magnitude. However, this result must be interpreted with 
great care. We cluster standard errors by country, being as conservative as possible, but this 
means that we essentially have as many observations as we have countries (when we evaluate 
the significance of the financial development interactions). With seven countries in Eastern 
Europe, our t-tests are unreliable, and clustered standard errors may be untrustworthy. 
Considering the differences between East and West is therefore fraught with difficulty arising 
from data limitations.  Overall, we conclude that financial development improves financial 
constraints on investment for the sub-sample of Western European countries and that Eastern 
Europe is not likely to be different.17 
6.4. Asset liquidity 
If firms are often financially constrained, this may affect behavior particularly in 
industries where assets are bad collateral. We might expect industries with plenty of assets 
suitable for collateralization to be much less affected. To test this, we compare industries with 
more or less liquid assets. The advantage of using industry characteristics, as opposed to 
estimated of actual firm asset liquidity, is that we do not have to worry about endogeneity. For 
example, perhaps firms in poor financial development countries chose to have more liquid 
assets (to cope with poor availability of external finance). They may be more financially 
constrained, but in fact look like they should be less (they have lots of liquid assets!). Using an 
invariant, industry-based measure gets around this. Our liquidity is exogenous to firms, so if 
firms in low liquidity industries react more to financial development, we can interpret this as a 
causal relationship with more confidence. 
                                                      
17 Our results from undertaking a country-by-country analysis (see Appendix) confirm the 
general conclusion that investment constraints are lower in better developed financial markets.  Subject to 
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Regressions by asset liquidity group are presented in Table 7. We divide the sample by 
industry, based on our US data on used asset turnover. The sample of high liquidity firms are 
those in the industries with above the 50th percentile of US asset turnover rates.  There are 
slightly more firms in the low liquidity sample because industries are of uneven size. 
Table 7, column (1) of both panels shows a regression with no interaction, recapping 
previous results. In panel 1, presenting the Euler Equation model, liquidity interactions are 
insignificant. This suggests that liquidity is not important for cash flow constraints, neither 
directly not indirectly through the effect of financial development. Panel 2, presenting the 
Econometric model, does suggest a role for liquidity. In both column (3) and (5) the liquidity 
triple interaction enters significantly and negatively. This suggests that the ameliorating effect 
of financial development (i.e. financial development => internal cash flow matters less) is weaker 
in high liquidity industries. In other words, firms in low liquidity industries are more affected by 
financial development than firms in high liquidity industries, as predicted.  
7. Conclusions 
In frictionless financial markets, investment does not depend on internal cash flows. In a 
large European data set, we find that firms invest more on average when they have higher cash 
flow. We contribute to the literature by testing formally if the coefficient on internal resources 
(cash flow) is related to a country’s financial development. Comparing countries, we find that 
the cash flow effect is indeed stronger in countries with weaker financial development. This 
suggests that financial constraints are strongest when financial development is low. 
The effect is weaker inside conglomerates and is probably not driven by the East-West 
difference. This is consistent with the idea that conglomerates ease internal financial constraints. 
Industries with few low liquid assets may experience bigger benefits of financial development 
(i.e. the cash flow coefficient is reduced more by financial development in low liquidity 
industries). However, the evidence for this is mixed. 
Our findings suggest that financial frictions operate in Europe. They suggest that 
financial development is beneficial because it reduces financial constraints at the firm level and 
therefore relaxes the correlation between internal resources and investment.  
21
ECB
Working Paper Series No 689
October 2006 
References  
Abel A and E. Eberly, 2002, “Q theory without adjustment costs and cash flow effects without 
financing constraints”, mimeo.  
Almeida, Heitor and Daniel Wolfenzon, 2006, “Should business groups be dismantled? The 
equilibrium costs of efficient internal capital markets,” Journal of Financial Economics 79 
(1), 99-144. 
Alti, Aydogan, 2003, “How Sensitive is Investment to Cash Flow When Financing is 
Frictionless”, Journal of Finance, 58(2), 707-722. 
Bartelsman, Eric J. and Mark Doms, 2000, “Understanding Productivity: Lessons from 
Longitudinal Microdata”, Journal of Economic Literature, 38, 569-94. 
Beck, Torsten, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Ross Levine, 2001, “The Financial Structure Database” 
in Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli, and Ross Levine, eds. Financial Structure and Economic 
Growth – A Cross-Country Comparison of Banks, Markets and Development, MIT 
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
Beck, Thorsten, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Vojislav Maksimovic, 2002, “Financing patterns 
around the world: the role of institutions” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 
2905, October. 
Besley, Timothy and Robin Burgess, 2004, “Can Labor Regulation Hinder Economic 
Performance? Evidence from India”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(1), 91-134. 
Bertrand, Marianne, Antionette Schoar and David Thesmar, 2004, “Banking Deregulation and 
Industry Structure: Evidence from the French Banking Reforms of 1985”, Working 
paper. 
Bond, S., J.A. Elston, J. Mairesse, and B. Mulkay, 2003, “Financial Factors and Investment in 
Belgium, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom: A Comparison Using Company 
Panel Data”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 85, 153-165.  
Bond, S., and J. Van Reenen, 2006, “Microeconometric models of investment and employment”, 
Forthcoming in J.J. Heckman and E.E. Leamer (eds) Handbook of Econometrics, Vol 6.  
Blanchard, Olivier and Francesco Giavazzi, 2004, “The Macroeconomic Effects of Regulation 




Working Paper Series No 689
October 2006 
Campello, Murillo, 2004, “Internal Capital Markets in Financial Conglomerates: Evidence from 
Small Bank Responses to Monetary Policy”, Journal of Finance, 57 (6), 2773-2805. 
Cooper, R. and J. Ejarque, 2001, “Exhuming Q: Market power vs. capital market imperfections”, 
NBER working paper 8182.  
Davis, Stephen and John Haltiwanger, 1999, “Gross Job Flows”, in Handbook of Labor Economics: 
Voume 3B, ed. Orley Ashenfelter and David Card. North Holland pp. 2711—2805. 
Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli and Vojislav Maksimovic, 1998, “Law, Finance and Firm Growth” Journal 
of Finance, December, 53(6), 2107 - 2137. 
Desai, Mihir, Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner, 2003, “Institutions, Capital Constraints and 
Entrepreneurial Firm Dynamics: Evidence from Europe”, NBER working paper 10165. 
Diamond, Douglas and Raghuram Rajan, 2000, “A Theory of Bank Capital”, Journal of Finance, 
December, 55(6), 2431-2465. 
Fazzari, Steven, Glenn Hubbard and Bruce Petersen, 1988, “Financing constraints and corporate 
investment”, Brookings Paper on Economic Activity, 1, 141-195. 
Gomes, J., 2001, Financing investment, American Economic Review, Vol 91(5), pp 1263-1285. 
Kaplan, Steven and Luigi Zingales, 1997, “Do investment-cash flow sensitivities provide useful 
measures of financing constraints?”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 169-215. 
Foster, Lucia, John Haltiwanger and C.J. Krizan, 1997, “Aggregate Employment Dynamics: 
Building from Microeconomic Evidence", American Economic Review, 87(1), 115-137.  
Heckman, James J. and Carmen Pages, 2000, “The Cost of Job Security Regulation: Evidence 
from Latin American Labor Markets”, NBER working paper 7773. 
Hoshi, Takeo, Anil Kashyap and David Scharfstein, 1991, “Corporate structure, liquidity and 
investment: Evidence from Japanese panel data”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106, 33-
60. 
King, Robert G. and Levine, Ross, 1993, “Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be Right", 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, August, 108(3), 681-737. 
Kumar, Krishna V., Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales, 2001, “What determines firms size?”, 
CRSP Working Paper No. 496.  
Moyen, Nathalie, 2004, “Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities: Constrained versus Unconstrained 
Firms”, Journal of Finance, 59(5), 2061-2092. 
23
ECB
Working Paper Series No 689
October 2006 
Myers, Stewart C. and Raghuram G. Rajan, 1998, “The Paradox of Liquidity”, The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 113, No. 3., August, 733-771. 
Petersen, Mitchell and Raghuram G. Rajan, 1995, “The Effect of Credit Market Competition on 
Firm-Creditor Relationships," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 407-443. 
Rajan, Raghuram, 1992, “Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm’s-
length Debt”, Journal of Finance, September, 67(4), 1367-1400. 
Rajan, Raghuram and Luigi Zingales. “Financial Development and Growth” American Economic 
Review, June 1998, 88, 559-586. 
Roberts, Mark J. and James R. Tybout, eds. 1996. Industrial Evolution in Developing Countries. 
Oxford University Press. 
Scarpetta, Stefano, Philip Hemmings, Thierry Tressel and Jaejoon Woo, 2002, “The Role of 
Policy and Institutions for Productivity and Firm Dynamics: Evidence from Micro and 
Industry data”, OECD working paper 329. 
Wurgler, Jeffrey, 2000, “Financial markets and the allocation of capital”, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 58, 187-214. 
24
ECB
Working Paper Series No 689
October 2006 
Table 1 – Financial development across countries  
This table summarizes two measure of financial development for sample countries. All numbers are averaged across 
available years for 1995-2003, and are taken from the Structural Database (Beck 2001). Private credit is the total value 
of credit from banks to the private sector, divided by GDP. Private credit & private bonds is the sum of private credit 
and total private bond market capitalization divided by GDP. 
Country Country  Code 
Private credit 1995-2003 
average (PCBank) 
Private credit plus  
private bonds 1988 
(PCBB) 
Austria AT  .  1.33 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
BA .  . 
Belgium BE  .  1.24 
Bulgaria BG  0.06  . 
Switzerland CH  1.66  2.06 
Serbia And 
Montenegro 
CS .  . 
Cyprus CY  .  . 
Czech Republic  CZ  0.68  0.59 
Germany DE  1.14  1.68 
Denmark DK  0.33  1.79 
Estonia EE 0.24  . 
Spain ES  0.81  1.04 
Finland FI 0.51  0.81 
France FR  .  . 
United Kingdom  GB  1.16  1.51 
Greece GR    0.46 
Croatia HR 0.38  . 
Hungary HU  0.23  0.29 
Eire IE  0.83  0.96 
Iceland IS 0.64  . 
Italy IT  0.57  1.01 
Liechtenstein LI  .  . 
Luxemburg LU  .  . 
Latvia LV  0.12  0.17 
Monaco MC  .  . 
Macedonia MK  .  . 
Malta MT .  . 
Netherlands NL  0.70  1.82 
Norway NO  0.86  1.04 
Poland PL 0.22  . 
Portugal PT  0.88  1.29 
Romania RO  0.09  . 
Sweden SE 1.17  1.37 
Slovenia SI  0.29  . 
Ukraine UA  0.05  . 
25
ECB
Working Paper Series No 689
October 2006 
Table 2 – Summary statistics 
Summary statistics for key variables for the basic models, the Euler equation model and the Econometric model. 
Investment is normalized by fixed assets in the previous year. PCBank is private credit and PCBB is private credit 
plus bond market capitalization, both divided by GDP. Cash flow is defined by Amadeus (the data sources) and 
corresponds to net income plus depreciation plus changes in deferred taxes. 
 
Variable 
N Mean  St. 
Dev. 
p10 p25  Medi
an 
p75 P90 
PCBank 1,879,691    0.820 0.332 0.330 0.570 0.810 1.140 1.160 
PCBB 1,879,691    1.454 0.661 0.750 0.930 1.370 1.570 2.620 
Conglomerate dummy  1,834,346   0.165  0.371  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 
Number of employees  2,111,378   172.7 2280.2  9.0  15.0 30.0 73.0  210.0 
Firm age  2,401,227   17.198  17.917  3.0 6.0  12.0  22.0  37.0 
Investment 1,128,477    0.500 0.908 0.029 0.083 0.220 0.518 1.132 
Lagged  Investment    813,484   0.511 0.914 0.031 0.089 0.230 0.535 1.156 
           
Variables used in the Euler 
equation model           
Square  of  lagged  investment  813,484   1.097 5.622 0.001 0.008 0.053 0.286 1.337 
Lagged output to capital ratio  1,416,848   1.933  1.748  -0.063  1.016  1.986  2.990  3.930 
Lagged  ROA  1,292,284  0.78 1.45 0.02 0.17 0.41 0.93 2.09 
           
Variables used in 
Econometric model           
Change in output  1,702,770   0.098 0.492 -0.163  -0.025 0.051 0.177 0.391 
Lagged change in output  1,151,866   0.112 0.471 -0.139  -0.015 0.060 0.187 0.400 
Twice lagged capital to 
output ratio (error correction)  954,973   -1.953 1.705 -3.908 -2.989 -2.002 -1.047 -0.011 
Cash flow/capital  1,310,226   0.595 1.302 0.000 0.121 0.305 0.694 1.606 
Lagged cash flow/capital  1,255,517   0.589 1.297 -0.001 0.120 0.304 0.689 1.588 
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Table 3 – Investment and cash flow: the effect of financial 
development 
Dependent variable in all regressions is gross investment (normalized by assets). ROA is defined as operating cash 
flow over fixed assets, and cash flow is defined as cash flow after taxes and interest over fixed assets. PCBank is the 
average for the 1995-2003 period of the ratio of the total stock of credit to the private sector to GDP. PCBB is the 
average for the 1995-2003 period of the sum of private credit and total private bond market capitalization divided by 
GDP. Column 1 uses all observations. Column 2 and 6 uses observations only for countries for which the relevant 
financial development variable is available (in column 2, PCBB, in column 6, PCBank). Column 4 and 7 exclude 
Switzerland. All regressions include fixed effects for country-year-industry interactions. Standard errors are clustered 
by country-industry-year in column 1 and by country in other columns. A plus sign (+) denotes a significant 
coefficient at the 10% level, one star (*) denotes significance at the 5% level, two stars at the 1% level. 
 
Euler equation 
model  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 













Lagged investment  0.161** 0.159** 0.158** 0.158** 0.161** 0.16**  0.16** 
  [0.003] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] 
-0.017** -0.017** -0.017** -0.017** -0.017** -0.017**  -0.017**  Lagged investment 
squared  [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
0.131** 0.134** 0.131** 0.131** 0.132** 0.129**  0.129**  Lagged output-
capital ratio  [0.002] [0.008] [0.009] [0.009] [0.006] [0.007] [0.007] 
Lagged ROA  0.059** 0.062** 0.122** 0.122** 0.059** 0.098**  0.098** 
  [0.002] [0.015] [0.018] [0.018] [0.010] [0.013] [0.013] 
    -0.037** -0.037**      Lagged ROA x 
PCBB     [0.011]  [0.011]     
       -0.096** -0.096**  Lagged ROA x 
PCBank        [0.026]  [0.026] 
         
R-squared  0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 
Observations  639,205 468,832 468,832 468,345 636,642 636,642 636,053 
Number of clusters  12,200  21  21  20  18  18  18 
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Table 3 continued 
 
Econometric model  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 













Lagged investment  0.005 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.006 0.006 
  [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] 
Change in output  0.26**  0.24**  0.236** 0.236** 0.257** 0.255** 0.255** 
  [0.010] [0.027] [0.026] [0.026] [0.033] [0.033] [0.033] 
Lagged change in output  0.194** 0.199** 0.195** 0.195** 0.190** 0.188** 0.188** 
  [0.005] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005] 
Error correction  -0.135** -0.141** -0.139** -0.139** -0.131** -0.131** -0.131** 
  [0.002] [0.008] [0.009] [0.009] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] 
Cash Flow  0.079** 0.087** 0.183** 0.183** 0.075** 0.087** 0.087** 
  [0.004] [0.030] [0.042] [0.042] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] 
Lagged cash flow  0.017** 0.014**  0.015*  0.015*  0.018** 0.018** 0.018** 
  [0.065]  [0.07]  [0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] 
Cash Flow x PCBB     -0.06** -0.06**     
     [0.019]  [0.019]     
Cash Flow x PCBank         0.098  0.098 
        [0.065]  [0.065] 
         
R-squared  0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.12 
Observations  503,660 370,675 370,660 370,298 469,436 469,436 469,059 
Number of clusters  9,542  20  20  19  17  17  16 
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Table 4 – Conglomerates 
Dependent variable is gross investment (normalized by assets). Column 1-3 use all observations, columns 4-6 
conglomerate firms only. Coefficients for control variables (see table 3) are not reported. All regressions include fixed 
effects for country-year-industry interactions. Standard errors are clustered by country. A plus sign (+) denotes a 
significant coefficient at the 10% level, one star (*) denotes significance at the 5% level, two stars at the 1% level. 
 
Euler equation model  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sample   All  All  All  Congl. Congl. Congl. 
        
Lagged ROA  0.059* 0.122*  0.098**  0.024**  0.056**  0.050** 
  [0.010] [0.018] [0.013] [0.005]  [0.15]  [0.012] 
        
Lagged ROA x PCBB   -0.037**     -0.014*   
   [0.011]    [0.007]  
        
Lagged ROA x PCBank     -0.096**     -0.043* 
     [0.026]    [0.017] 
        
R-squared 0.12  0.13  0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16 
Observations  636,642 468,832 636,642  91,525  71,186  91,525 
Number of clusters  25  21  25 25 21 25 
Econometric model  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sample   All  All  All  Congl. Congl. Congl. 
        
Cash Flow  0.017**  0.183**  0.13**  0.021+ 0.067*  0.061** 
  [0.065]  [0.042]  [0.030]  [0.011] [0.027] [0.020] 
         
Cash Flow x PCBB    -0.060**     -0.02+  
    [0.019]     [0.012]  
           
Cash Flow x PCBank      -0.148**     -0.068* 
      [0.044]     [0.024] 
        
R-squared  0.13 0.14 0.07 0.17 0.18 0.17 
Observations  503,660 370,675 501,167  70,149  54,249  70,149 
Number of clusters  9,542  20 25 23 19 23 
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Table 5 – Excluding finance and real estate 
Dependent variable is gross investment (normalized by assets). Firms with primary industry classification NAICS 52 
or 53 are excluded. Coefficients for control variables (see table 3) are not reported. All regressions include fixed 
effects for country-year-industry interactions. Standard errors are clustered by country-industry-year in column 2 
and 3 and by country in other columns. A plus sign (+) denotes a significant coefficient at the 10% level, one star (*) 
denotes significance at the 5% level, two stars at the 1% level. 
 
Euler equation model  (1) (2) (3) 
Sample   Non-financial, non-real estate firms 
     
Lagged ROA  0.059** 0.121** 0.065** 
  [0.002] [0.019] [0.008] 
     
Lagged ROA x PCBB    -0.037**   
   [0.012]   
     
Lagged ROA x PCBank     -0.066+ 
      [0.038] 
 
R-squared  0.12 0.13 0.11 
Observations 639,208  454,117 583,300 
Number of clusters  12,220  21  18 
Econometric model  (1) (2) (3) 
Sample   Non-financial, non-real estate firms 
     
Cash Flow  0.079** 0.184** 0.138** 
 [0.004]  [0.043]  [0.030] 
     
Cash Flow x PCBB    -0.061**   
   [0.020]   
     
Cash Flow x PCBank      -0.15** 
     [0.045] 
     
R-squared  0.13 0.14 0.13 
Observations  503,660 359,184 485,533 
Number of clusters  9,542  20  25 
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Table 6 – Geographical subsamples 
Dependent variable is gross investment (normalized by assets). Coefficients for control variables (see table 3) are not 
reported. All regressions include fixed effects for country-year-industry interactions. Standard errors are clustered by 
country-industry-year in column 1 and 4 and by country in other columns. A plus sign (+) denotes a significant 
coefficient at the 10% level, one star (*) denotes significance at the 5% level, two stars at the 1% level. 
 
Euler equation model  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Sample   All 
       
Lagged ROA  0.059** 0.122** 0.120** 0.066** 0.100** 
  [0.020] [0.018] [0.020] [0.008] [0.016] 
       
Lagged ROA x PCBB   -0.037**  -0.036**   
   [0.011]  [0.012]     
       
Lagged ROA x PCBank       -0.068+ -0.100** 
      [0.038]  [0.031] 
       
Lagged ROA x East      -0.015    0.042 
     [0.041]  [0.046] 
       
Lagged ROA x PCBB X East      0.048    
     [0.036]    
       
Lagged ROA x PCBank X East       0.292 
       [0.184] 
       
R-squared  0.12 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.12 
Observations  639,208 468,832 468,832 602,175 636,642 
Number  of  clusters  12,220  21 21 18 26 
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Econometric model  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Sample   All firms 
       
Cash Flow  0.079** 0.183** 0.182** 0.138**  0.14** 
  [0.004] [0.042] [0.053] [0.030] [0.041] 
       
Cash Flow x PCBB    -0.06** -0.06*    
   [0.019]  [0.024]    
       
Cash Flow x PCBank      -0.148** -0.160* 
      [0.044]  [0.062] 
       
Cash Flow x East     -0.018    -0.102 
     [0.072]  [0.069] 
       
Cash Flow x PCBB X East     0.051    
     [0.067]    
       
Cash Flow x PCBank X East       0.686* 
       [0.260] 
       
R-squared  0.13 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.14 
Observations  503,660 370,675 370,675 500,725 501,167 
Number of clusters  9,542  20 20 23 25 
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Table 7 – Asset liquidity subsamples 
Dependent variable is gross investment (normalized by assets). Coefficients for control variables (see table 3) are not 
reported. Hi_Liq is a dummy equal to one for all firms whose main industry is classified as having highly liquid 
assets. All regressions include fixed effects for country-year-industry interactions. Standard errors are clustered by 
country-industry-year in column 1 and 4 and by country in other columns. A plus sign (+) denotes a significant 
coefficient at the 10% level, one star (*) denotes significance at the 5% level, two stars at the 1% level. 
Euler equation model  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Sample   All 
       
Lagged ROA  0.059** 0.122** 0.120** 0.066** 0.098** 
  [0.020] [0.018] [0.039] [0.008] [0.018] 
       
Lagged ROA x PCBB   -0.037**  -0.065    
   [0.011]  [0.051]     
       
Lagged ROA x PCBank       -0.068+ -0.091* 
      [0.038]  [0.035] 
       
Lagged ROA x Hi_Liq      -0.007    0.002 
     [0.020]  [0.011] 
       
Lagged ROA x PCBB X 
Hi_Liq     -0.065    
     [0.051]    
       
Lagged ROA x PCBank X 
H i _ L i q        0.004 
       [0.018] 
       
R-squared  0.12 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.12 
Observations  639,208 468,832 226,589 602,175 636,642 
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Econometric model  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Sample   All firms 
       
Cash Flow  0.079** 0.183** 0.200** 0.138** 0.155** 
  [0.004] [0.042] [0.047] [0.030] [0.032] 
       
Cash Flow x PCBB    -0.06** -0.064*    
   [0.019]  [0.024]    
       
Cash Flow x PCBank      -0.148** -0.164** 
      [0.044]  [0.053] 
       
Cash Flow x Hi_Liq     -0.024    -0.022* 
     [0.013]  [0.010] 
       
Cash Flow x PCBB X Hi_Liq     0.015**    
     [0.005]    
       
Cash Flow x PCBank X 
H i _ L i q        0.044* 
       [0.018] 
       
R-squared  0.13 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.14 
Observations  503,660 370,675 179,354 500,725 243,043 
Number of clusters  9,542  20 20 23 25 
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Appendix: results from running the Euler equation model and 
Econometric model separately by country 
 
Table A.1: Country wise results for the Euler equation model 
Dependent variable in all regressions is gross investment (normalized by assets). ROA is defined as operating cash 
flow over fixed assets.  All regressions include the firm level variables and industry-year fixed effects used in the 
Euler equation model specifications in Table 1 (see text). Standard errors are clustered by industry-year. A plus sign 
(+) denotes a significant coefficient at the 10% level, one star (*) denotes significance at the 5% level, two stars at the 
1% level. 
 





Austria 0.056  [0.114] 
Bosnia And Herzegovina  0.208  [0.232] 
Belgium 0.049**  [0.006] 
Bulgaria 0.077**  [0.022] 
Switzerland -0.015  [0.037] 
Serbia And Montenegro  0.12**  [0.040] 
Czech Republic  0.092*  [0.038] 
Germany 0.013  [0.022] 
Denmark 0.026  [0.022] 
Estonia 0.077**  [0.019] 
Spain 0.087**  [0.005] 
Finland 0.06**  [0.008] 
France 0.053**  [0.004] 
United Kingdom  0.019**  [0.003] 
Greece 0.073**  [0.007] 
Croatia 0.132**  [0.016] 
Hungary -0.127  [0.205] 
Italy 0.095**  [0.005] 
Luxembourg -0.063  [0.049] 
Latvia 0.235  [0.377] 
Netherlands 0.036*  [0.014] 
Norway 0.048**  [0.007] 
Poland 0.045**  [0.012] 
Portugal 0.033  [0.039] 
Sweden 0.071**  [0.007] 
Ukraine 0.089**  [0.028] 
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October 2006Figure A.1: Constraints versus financial development (Euler equation model) 
This figure plots the coefficients on lagged ROA from the Euler equation model versus PCBB, for countries where the 
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Table A.2: Country wise results for the Econometric model 
Dependent variable in all regressions is gross investment (normalized by assets). Cash flow is defined as cash flow 
after taxes and interest over fixed assets.  All regressions include the firm level variables and industry-year fixed 
effects used in the Econometric model specification in Table 1 (see text). Standard errors are clustered by industry-
year. A plus sign (+) denotes a significant coefficient at the 10% level, one star (*) denotes significance at the 5% level, 
two stars at the 1% level. 
 
 







Austria -0.028  [0.215] 
Bosnia And Herzegovina  0.147  [0.140] 
Belgium 0.071**  [0.012] 
Bulgaria 0.058+ [0.030] 
Switzerland 0.083  [0.122] 
Serbia And Montenegro  0.309**  [0.078] 
Czech Republic  0.227**  [0.037] 
Germany 0.079+ [0.041] 
Denmark 0.061+ [0.031] 
Estonia 0.133**  [0.021] 
Spain 0.098**  [0.009] 
Finland 0.053**  [0.017] 
France 0.055**  [0.005] 
United Kingdom  0.014*  [0.006] 
Greece 0.062**  [0.010] 
Croatia 0.266**  [0.026] 
Hungary -0.781  [0.627] 
Italy 0.199**  [0.010] 
Luxembourg 0.255**  [0.058] 
Latvia -0.197  [0.225] 
Netherlands 0.032  [0.035] 
Norway 0.017  [0.014] 
Poland 0.082**  [0.023] 
Portugal 0.002  [0.071] 
Sweden 0.102**  [0.013] 
Ukraine 0.063  [0.043] 
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Figure A.2: Constraints versus financial development (Econometric model) 
This figure plots the coefficients on lagged ROA from the Econometric equation model versus PCBB, for countries 
where the coefficient is significant. PCBB is the sum of private credit and total private bond market capitalization 
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Table A.3: Regression of country-wise coefficients on financial development 
Column (1) reports results from regression of the country-wise coefficients on Lagged ROA (reported in Table A.1) 
on PCBB. Column (2) reports results from regression of the country-wise coefficients on Cash flow (reported in Table 
A.1) on PCBB. PCBB is the sum of private credit and total private bond market capitalization divided by GDP.  To 
account for the standard errors of the coefficients, each observation is weighted by the inverse of the estimated 











    
PCBB  -0.032** -0.050** 
  [0.006] [0.0151] 
Constant  0.109** 0.155** 
  [0.011] [0.027] 
    
R-squared 0.629  0.380 
Observations  20 20 
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